Safe at Home Base?  A Look at the Military’s New Approach to Dealing with Domestic Violence on Military Installations by Heintz, Jennifer
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 48 
Number 1 Unequal Treatment: Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Health Care (Fall 2003) 
Article 11 
12-1-2003 
Safe at Home Base? A Look at the Military’s New Approach to 
Dealing with Domestic Violence on Military Installations 
Jennifer Heintz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jennifer Heintz, Safe at Home Base? A Look at the Military’s New Approach to Dealing with Domestic 
Violence on Military Installations, 48 St. Louis U. L.J. (2003). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol48/iss1/11 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
277 
SAFE AT HOME BASE?  A LOOK AT THE MILITARY’S NEW 
APPROACH TO DEALING WITH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON 
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As American soldiers returned home from Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan during the summer of 2002, disturbing reports began to come out 
of Fort Bragg2 in North Carolina.  In the space of six weeks, four women and 
one man were murdered by their spouses.3  Two of the murdered women’s 
husbands then committed suicide.4  The women who were killed were 
attempting to get out of troubled marriages; their soldier husbands “refused to 
let go.”5  These tragic deaths turned a much-needed spotlight on the way the 
military handles domestic violence within its ranks.6  Sorely needed reforms 
were already being discussed before the Fort Bragg deaths.  It is hoped that this 
tragedy will spur faster implementation of reforms that will bring increased 
protections for all victims of domestic violence living in military communities. 
This Comment will explore the occurrence of domestic violence in the 
United States as a whole and efforts by the state and federal government to 
deal with the problem.  The Comment will then explore the military’s past 
 
 1. This Comment was originally conceived and written as an argument in favor of 
expanding the protections of the full faith and credit and enforcement provisions of the Violence 
Against Women Act to residents of military bases in recognition of the fact that a loophole in the 
law led to the exclusion of federal enclave residents.  The need for such an argument has been 
obviated by the passage of the Armed Forces Domestic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-311, § 2(a), 
116 Stat. 2455 (December 2, 2002) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.A. § 1561a (West Supp. 
2003)).  This Act will be discussed in detail, as will other efforts the military is making to better 
address the problem of domestic violence within its ranks. 
 2. Fort Bragg, located near Fayetteville, North Carolina, is the world’s largest airborne 
facility and one of the largest Army bases in the United States.  See Fayetteville Area Convention 
& Visitor’s Bureau, Military Installations, at http://www.visitfayettevillenc.com/bragg.htm (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2003). 
 3. Niles Lathem, How GI Heroes Turned Homes into Killing Fields, N.Y. POST, Aug. 4, 
2002, at 8.  Two of the women were shot in the head, one woman was strangled, and one woman 
was stabbed fifty times.  Id.  The man, an Army major, was shot by his civilian wife.  Barbra 
Bateman, How Will Fort Bragg Face the Murders?, N.Y. POST, Aug. 1, 2002, at 27. 
 4. Lathem, supra note 3, at 8. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Ron Martz, Lawmakers Study Military Spouse Abuse: Fatal Violence Spurs Search 
for Solutions, ATL. J.–CONST., Oct. 1, 2002, at A15. 
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responses to domestic violence and the reasons the military’s efforts were 
largely unaffected by previous changes in state and federal laws.  Next, the 
new steps being taken by the military in response to domestic violence in 
military communities and the effect these changes should have on domestic 
violence intervention and prevention will be explored.  Finally, recent changes 
in federal law that will have a substantial effect on the way the military handles 
domestic violence will also be discussed. 
Domestic violence is a persistent and widespread problem in American 
society.  The statistics are chilling.  Estimates indicate that four million 
American women are battered by their husbands or partners each year.7  
Domestic violence accounts for more injuries to American women than the 
injuries caused by muggings, stranger-to-stranger crimes, and occupational 
hazards combined.8  An incident of domestic violence will occur at least once 
in more than a quarter of all marriages.9  One husband in eight is physically 
aggressive toward his wife at least one time a year.10  One in fourteen 
marriages involve severe and repeated violence.11  Domestic violence 
“accounts for thirty-one percent of all murders of women.”12  Women of all 
races and economic classes experience domestic violence.13  “An estimated 
fifty percent of all American women are battered at some time in their lives.”14 
 
 7. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: 
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 807-08 (1993).  This 
estimate may be conservative; the majority of “national estimates are obtained from surveys 
which have typically excluded the very poor, those who do not speak English fluently, those 
whose lives are especially chaotic, military families, and persons who are hospitalized, homeless, 
institutionalized, or incarcerated.”  Id. at 809. 
 8. G. Kristian Miccio, Male Violence—State Silence: These and Other Tragedies of the 
20th Century, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 339, 343-44 (2002). 
 9. Klein & Orloff, supra note 7, at 808-09. 
 10. Id. at 809. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic 
Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1849 (2002).  Epstein’s argument is that states have 
gone so far in the direction of trying to aid the victim that the rights of alleged offenders are often 
infringed.  See id. at 1845-46. 
 13. Klein & Orloff, supra note 7, at 807.  While men are sometimes victims of domestic 
violence, 90-95% of reported domestic assault victims are women abused by their partners.  
Russell P. Dobash, The Myth of Sexual Symmetry in Marital Violence, 39 SOC. PROBS. 71, 74-75 
(1992).  For this reason, victims of domestic violence will be referred to as female throughout this 
Comment. 
 14. Klein & Orloff, supra note 7, at 808. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] SAFE AT HOME BASE? 279 
II.  LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE 
CIVILIAN SECTOR 
For centuries, the legal system condoned domestic violence.15  Physical 
punishment of wives by husbands was explicitly legal in the United States well 
into the nineteenth century.16  Even when such conduct was no longer 
expressly legal, the states were unwilling to interfere with family affairs except 
in cases of extreme violence.17  This attitude persisted until late in the 
twentieth century.18  Spurred on by the efforts of victim advocates within the 
battered women’s movement, reforms such as relaxed standards for 
warrantless arrests, mandatory arrest statutes, increased aggressiveness in the 
prosecution of domestic violence cases, and automatic issuance of no-contact 
orders as a condition of pretrial release have become widespread in recent 
decades.19  In addition to the increased response to domestic violence by the 
states, Congress became involved in the struggle against domestic violence 
when it passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)20 in 1994 and 
amended the Gun Control Act of 196821 with the 1996 Lautenberg 
Amendment,22 which gave the federal government the power to prosecute 
certain types of domestic violence crimes.23 
Currently, all states have civil protective order statutes.  These statutes 
provide basic tools that victims of domestic violence might utilize in their 
efforts to leave the abusive relationship, including immediate ex parte 
protection,24 child support, temporary child custody, a safe means of 
exchanging children for scheduled visits with the non-custodial parent, and 
stay-away provisions.25  A full order of protection is generally valid for one to 
three years and may be renewed if a need for continued protection is 
 
 15. See Epstein, supra note 12, at 1850. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 1850-51. 
 18. Id. at 1851. 
 19. Id. at 1853-58. 
 20. Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, § 40001, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 21. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 921–928 (2000)). 
 22. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009–371 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000)).  The Violence Against Women Act was originally passed in 1994 and 
amended by Congress in 2000. 
 23. See James M. Peters, Federal Domestic Violence Laws–2001, ADVOC. (Idaho), Aug. 
2001, at 15. 
 24. An ex parte order of protection is granted solely on the basis of the victim’s petition and 
grants protection until a full hearing is held.  See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 455.035 (2000). 
 25. Epstein, supra note 12, at 1858-59. 
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demonstrated.26  Every state has made the violation of a protective order a 
criminal offense.27 
Several provisions within the VAWA have contributed to the effectiveness 
of protective orders by enabling women to escape violent intimate partners and 
not just violent spouses.  Under the VAWA, an “intimate partner” is a spouse, 
former spouse, a past or present cohabitant (if the relationship resembled a 
marriage), parents who have a child in common, and other persons similarly 
situated to spouses (including same-sex partners) if they are protected by the 
domestic or family violence laws of the state or reservation where the victim 
resides or was injured.28 
It is now a federal crime to travel across state lines or into or out of tribal 
lands with the specific intent to violate a valid order of protection.29  The 
VAWA also provides that valid protective orders issued by a state court or 
Native American tribe be accorded full faith and credit by the courts of other 
states or tribes and enforced as the state or tribe would enforce its own orders, 
as long as certain criteria are met.30  Permanent, temporary or ex parte orders 
can satisfy full faith and credit requirements.31  To qualify for full faith and 
credit, an order must be issued by a court that has jurisdiction over the parties 
and must comport with due process requirements in that the defendant must 
have had reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard.32  A mutual order 
of protection33 will not qualify for full faith and credit if “(a) the original 
respondent did not file a cross or counter petition seeking a protective order or 
(b) if such a cross or counter petition was filed, but the court did not make 
specific findings that each party was entitled to such an order.”34  Mutual or 
consent orders of protection are often issued without a hearing or a specific 
finding of abuse, and because of this procedure, they do not fulfill the 
VAWA’s requirement of reasonable notice or opportunity to be heard 
necessary to qualify for recognition of the orders in other jurisdictions. 
 
 26. Id. at 1859-60. 
 27. Id. at 1860. 
 28. 18 U.S.C. § 2266 (2000). 
 29. Id. § 2262(a)(1). 
 30. Id. § 2265(a). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. § 2265(b). 
 33. Under a mutual order of protection, both parties are subject to the terms of the order.  
Mutual orders are also known as consent orders.  See Catherine F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: 
Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders Under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 29 
FAM. L.Q. 253, 266-68 (1995) (discussing mutual protection orders). 
 34. Peters, supra note 23, at 18. 
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III.  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE MILITARY 
A. History and Overview of Treatment of Domestic Violence in the Military 
While state and federal laws, along with community-based advocacy and 
assistance programs, have combined to give victims of domestic violence in 
the civilian sector many resources to end abusive relationships more safely, 
victims of domestic violence within the military have been largely excluded 
from the purview of these laws.  The Violence Against Women Act explicitly 
applies to states and Native American lands, but it does not mention military 
installations, which are often areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction.  To 
explain why efforts to prevent and respond effectively to domestic violence in 
the military have lagged behind similar efforts in the civilian sector, a brief 
discussion of the deference that Congress and the courts have traditionally 
shown the military and military base commanders is necessary. 
Congress has passed legislation that gives military base commanders broad 
discretion, and the courts have been unwilling to interfere in decisions made 
within the military in the exercise of that discretion.  An example of such 
discretion includes the right to exclude specific individuals from the base.35  
Whom to exclude is left largely to the commander, and the courts will not 
question or reverse the commander’s decision unless the denial of access is 
found to be “patently arbitrary or discriminatory.”36  The rationale for this 
broad authority is that it is the commander’s “duty to maintain the order, 
security, and discipline necessary to military operations.”37  This power has 
been exercised to exclude civilians working on military bases without allowing 
the worker the opportunity for a hearing or a chance to counter the charges (or 
even to know specifically what they were),38 and to prohibit the door-to-door 
distribution of printed advertising material because it interfered with the ability 
of the Civilian Enterprise Newspaper (CEN)39 to attract advertisers.40  The 
 
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (2000). 
 36. United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 984. 
 37. United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1973). 
 38. See Cafeteria and Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961) 
(summarily revoking the identification badge and security clearance of worker because of 
unspecified security concerns did not violate the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment or the 
worker’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 39. A CEN is a civilian-run publication that publishes only content prepared by the public 
affairs department of the base.  See Shopco Dist. Co. v. Commanding Gen. of Marine Corps Base, 
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 885 F.2d 167, 169 (4th Cir. 1989).  The CEN is the primary 
medium used by the commander to communicate with base personnel.  Id. 
 40. See id. at 172 (noting that military bases have traditionally been considered a nonpublic 
forum, and the base commander could prohibit content neutral door-to-door distributions in 
residential areas of the base to protect the monopoly of the CEN without violating the First 
Amendment). 
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base commander also has the discretion to declare a base either open or closed 
to the public and to exclude groups or specific individuals from the base, a 
right that has been exercised through the use of so-called “bar letters” to ban 
protesters and political activists.41  Interestingly, the United States Department 
of Defense (DoD) has indicated some reservations about using this authority to 
ban civilian domestic violence offenders from the base.42 
Given this broad authority, it is not surprising that the military had been 
left largely untouched by efforts to effectively combat domestic violence.  
Despite this deference,43 the murders at Fort Bragg reinforced an already 
apparent need for a stronger approach to domestic violence in military 
communities.44 
Military families are not immune to domestic violence.  Some studies 
indicate that the domestic violence rate in the military is five times as high as 
that of the civilian population, although other studies find the rates to be 
roughly equivalent.45  Whatever the rate, the realities of military life can make 
it extremely difficult for victims of domestic violence to get the services they 
 
 41. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 681-82 (1985) (holding a nine-year-old bar 
letter still valid to prevent recipient from attending military open house); United States v. 
LaValley, 957 F.2d 1309, 1313 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the granting of an easement to the 
state government for use as a road did not give the recipient of a bar letter the right to be on the 
land). 
 42. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THIRD YEAR REP. 
2003, at 155, available at www.dtic.mil/domesticviolence/reports/DV_RPT3.PDF [hereinafter 
DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE].  The Task Force had recommended such 
action; the DoD agreed only to study the issue.  Id. 
 43. The Supreme Court has held that “judicial deference . . . is at its apogee when legislative 
action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and 
regulations for their governance is challenged.”  Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981).  
Recurrent evidence of this high degree of judicial deference to the military can been seen in the 
courts’ treatment of the military’s “don’t ask/don’t tell” policy regarding homosexuals.  10 U.S.C. 
§ 654(b)(2) (2000).  Courts have subjected the policy only to rational basis review and have 
upheld the status/conduct distinction that allows a service member to be removed from the 
military for such “conduct” as making a mere statement of homosexual identity.  See Able v. 
United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d. Cir. 1998); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 
1128 (9th Cir. 1997); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 
519 U.S. 948; Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Steffan v. Perry, 41 
F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc).  The reason for such deference is the view that life-
appointed federal judges are not suited to make military decisions or “exercise military 
authority.”  Able, 155 F.3d at 634. 
 44. Martz, supra note 6. 
 45. Allen G. Breed, Does Army Breed Domestic Violence? Government to Probe Slayings at 
Fort Bragg, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Sept. 3-4, 2002, at A7.  There are currently 
proposals in place to study the issue of domestic violence in the military.  For information about 
recommended areas of specific research, see DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
supra note 42, at 154. 
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need.46  Domestic abuse survivor and Harvard Law School graduate Sarah M. 
Buel cites one partner in an abusive relationship being in the military as an 
obstacle for the other partner to leave.  She wrote: 
If the victim or the perpetrator is in the military, an effective intervention is 
largely dependent on the commander’s response, regardless of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), its provisions for a military protective 
order, and the availability of assistance from the Family Advocacy Programs.  
Many commanders believe that it is more important to salvage the soldier’s 
military career than to ensure the victim’s safety.  Other victims are unaware 
that they are entitled to a short-term stipend if they report the abuse and lose 
the soldier’s financial support as a result.47 
The spousal killings at Fort Bragg in the summer of 2002 have drawn 
attention to the ineffective way the military has handled domestic violence.48  
Critics, including a congressional fact-finding group, have called attention to 
the inadequacy of the services available on military bases and the lack of 
cooperation with civilian law enforcement and independent advocacy and 
support programs.49  Critics also point to the problems presented by the 
unwillingness of soldiers to seek outside counseling or assistance because of 
the lack of privacy in the military and the detrimental effect a history of mental 
health or domestic problems can have on a soldier’s career.50  “Advocates who 
track domestic violence in the military say that although the Pentagon claims it 
has a zero-tolerance policy, that policy is applied inconsistently across the 
services, and many bases do not have effective programs for victims.”51  An 
examination of the military’s Family Advocacy Program (FAP) will show how 
woefully far the military had lagged behind the rest of the country in terms of 
its response to domestic violence. 
The FAP procedures for dealing with domestic violence in the military 
when the killings occurred at Fort Bragg became effective in 1992.52  DoD 
Directive 6400.1 provides that when an alleged act of abuse occurs, the FAP 
officer of the base must be informed and has the responsibility for assuring that 
 
 46. Advocacy groups have identified such factors as frequent and lengthy separations, 
infidelity, low pay, and the stresses associated with combat as factors that can trigger situations 
that lead to the inappropriate response of domestic violence.  See T. Trent Gegax et al., Death in 
the Ranks at Fort Bragg, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 2002, at 30. 
 47. Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims Stay, COLO. 
LAWYER, Oct. 1999, at 19, 24 (footnotes omitted). 
47 See Marianne Szegedy-Maszak, Death at Fort Bragg, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 12, 
2002, at 44. 
48 Martz, supra note 6. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Moni Basu, Fort Bragg Killings Change Army’s Attitude on Stress, ATL. J.–CONST., 
Aug. 30, 2002, at A1. 
 52. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 6400.1: FAMILY ADVOCACY PROGRAM § 8, at 
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/dir2.html (June 23, 1992) [hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE]. 
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the victim receives appropriate medical treatment, that the commanding officer 
and military law enforcement and investigative bodies are properly notified, 
and that the rights of the alleged abuser are properly observed.53  Each case is 
to be reviewed by a Case Review Committee (CRC).54  The CRC has 
responsibility for reviewing the information available and making a 
determination of whether the alleged abuse is “substantiated,” “suspected,” or 
“unsubstantiated.”55  The CRC makes recommendations to the commanding 
officer about placement of a service member in a treatment program and, if 
treatment is undertaken, keeps the commander informed of progress made.56  
To ensure timeliness, commanders, under locally-decided guidelines, are to 
receive full information on the case in order to make a disposition.57  Factors to 
be considered in this decision include the service member’s performance in the 
military and the potential for future service, prognosis for treatment of the 
abusive behavior as determined by a clinician with experience in diagnosis and 
treatment, the extent to which the alleged abuser acknowledges accountability 
for the behavior and indicates a desire to be treated for it, and other factors 
deemed important by the commander.58 
While the DoD Directive covering domestic violence purports to express 
concern for the victim, the first factor to be considered by the commanding 
officer is the service member’s past performance and whether or not the soldier 
can be of further use to the military.59  Also, the DoD Directive only addresses 
spousal abuse situations in which the abuser is the soldier; it does not appear to 
contemplate a situation in which a service member is abused by a civilian 
spouse living on the base, although such abuse surely occurs.60  Another 
troubling aspect of DoD Directive 6400.1 is that while it is purportedly the 
policy of the DoD to cooperate with civilian authorities in responding to 
 
 53. Id. § 6.1. 
 54. Id. § 6.2. The Domestic Violence Task Force has suggested that the CRC be replaced 
with a Domestic Violence Assessment and Intervention Team in cases of spousal abuse.  The 
DoD has not yet taken a position on the issue.  DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
supra note 42, at 115-16, 167. 
 55. DOD DIRECTIVE, supra note 52, § 6.2.  Substantiated cases are those where a 
preponderance of the information reviewed supports a finding that abuse has occurred.  Id. § 
E2.1.2.1.  Suspect cases are those that require further investigation, although a case cannot be in 
this category and be investigated for more than twelve weeks.  Id. § E2.1.2.2.  An unsubstantiated 
claim is one where the information does not support a finding of abuse.  Id. § E2.1.2.3.  A family 
in this category is deemed not to require advocacy services.  Id. 
 56. Id. § 6.2. 
 57. Id. § 6.3. 
 58. DOD DIRECTIVE, supra note 52, at §§ 6.3.3-6.3.4. 
 59. Id. § 6.3.1. 
 60. See Cobb v. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (Mass. 1989) (service woman abused by civilian 
spouse). 
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incidents of domestic violence,61 the base commander, in exercising his 
discretion under Section 6, is not required to involve the civilian authorities at 
all.62  The 1992 version of DoD Directive 6400.1 did not adequately emphasize 
the criminality of some domestic violence, nor did it stress the military’s 
intolerance for such conduct and the need to hold offenders accountable.  The 
provisions for assistance to the victim were also weak. 
Victim’s advocacy groups present for a congressional subcommittee 
meeting following the murders at Fort Bragg said:  “[T]he military’s internal 
domestic-abuse prevention program, the largest in the world, does not work for 
a variety of reasons.”63  Tyniesse Harrison, executive director of the Breast 
Cancer Resource Center of Fayetteville64 and a victim’s advocate, said that a 
major problem is that often when complaints are made to a commander, no 
action is taken because the commander is also abusive.65  Another problem is 
that the military’s desire to handle the problem internally may prevent them 
from using resources available in the community.  “Civilian agencies could 
provide much-needed expertise and resources in addition to the confidentiality 
victims seek when they file complaints against abusive spouses, something that 
is not available to them on post if they ask for help . . . .”66  Lack of 
responsiveness on the part of base commanders and a lack of confidentiality 
prevented many victims from seeking assistance. 
B. Current Efforts to Address Domestic Violence in the Military 
The military knew that domestic violence within its ranks was a serious 
problem long before the deaths at Fort Bragg.  In February 2001, the Defense 
Task Force on Domestic Violence (Task Force)67 issued an initial report to the 
 
 61. Id. § 4.6. 
 62. Id. § 6.1.  Civilian agencies and state law enforcement mechanisms and procedures, 
including civil protective orders, must and will play a much larger role in responding to military 
domestic violence in the future.  See infra Part V. 
 63. Martz, supra note 6. 
 64. Fayetteville, N.C., is the town nearest Fort Bragg. 
 65. Martz, supra note 6. 
 66. Id. 
 67. The Task Force was created by Congress in 2000 to address the problem of domestic 
violence in the military.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-65, 113 Stat. 512 (1999).  The Task Force was to last three years and was directed to issue 
annual reports containing recommendations for improving the military’s response to domestic 
violence.  DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at v.  The second 
report dealt extensively with issues of cross-cultural sensitivity and special problems that can 
arise when domestic violence occurs in military families stationed overseas.  Id. at 4.  These 
issues are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
  The Task Force issued its final report in 2003.  The DoD has not issued a response to 
many of the recommendations made in this final report.  For a comprehensive compilation of the 
Task Force reports and DoD responses, see DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
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United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.  The initial report 
acknowledged that the military’s prevention “efforts have not always kept 
victims safe or held batterers accountable and stopped the violence.”68  In its 
initial report and in its two subsequent reports, the Task Force recommended 
that several steps be taken to address many problems, both as to the military’s 
domestic violence prevention efforts and its response to domestic violence.69  
The third and final report, issued in 2003, contains a listing of the nearly 200 
Task Force recommendations, along with the DoD’s response to the 
recommendations and a status report showing whether any action has been 
taken on the recommendations.70 
The Task Force recommended several changes to the FAP guidelines 
dealing with domestic violence.  The Task Force recognized the inadequacy of 
base programs and recommended that base and regional commanders be 
required to seek Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with local communities 
to address ways of responding to violence.71  The DoD agreed with this 
recommendation and agreed to amend DoD Directive 6400.1 accordingly.72  
The implementation of this and similar recommendations is an important shift 
away from the traditional military policy of addressing domestic violence 
problems internally.73  Access to services away from the military base is an 
important way to ensure confidentiality, something of concern to both victims 
 
COMPILATION OF REPORTS: 2001–2003 (2003), available at http://www.dtic.mil/ 
domesticviolence/reports/Start.pdf. 
 68. Memorandum from the United States Department of Defense to Secretaries of the 
Military Departments in Letter from Jack Klimp and Deborah Tucker, Co-Chairs of the Defense 
Task Force on Domestic Violence, to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, United States 
Department of Defense (Feb. 28, 2001), available at http://www.dtic.mil/domesticviolence.  The 
letter was included as an introduction for the Secretary of Defense when he was forwarded the 
Initial Report of the Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence upon its completion, and it is 
currently incorporated into the report. 
 69. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at vi.  The Task Force 
recommended improvement in several key areas: (1) programs to ensure the safety of victims; (2) 
emphasis on holding the offender accountable; (3) creation of a climate that effectively prevents 
domestic violence; (4) “coordination and collaboration among all military organizations with 
responsibility or jurisdiction with respect to domestic violence;” (5) cooperation among civilian 
and military communities regarding domestic violence issues; (6) topics that should be priorities 
for research; (7) collection of data regarding domestic violence and a system for managing and 
tracking cases; (8) establishing a curriculum and providing training to commanding officers; (9) 
preventing and responding to domestic violence on overseas military bases; (10) other issues 
deemed by the Task Force to relate to domestic violence in the military.  Id. 
 70. See id. at 148-69. 
 71. Id. at 148.  In response to a recommendation from the Task Force, the DoD agreed that 
DoD Directive 6400.1 would be amended so that the MOUs with civilian agencies would include 
a means of conducting formal and informal fatality reviews.  Id. at 151. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Martz, supra note 6. 
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and offenders.  A victim may also choose to seek assistance off of the military 
base to avoid the military’s complex chain-of-command procedures. 
The DoD, again in accordance with a Task Force recommendation, has 
agreed to amend DoD Directive 6400.1 with regard to its provisions for the 
issuance of military protective orders (MPOs).74  The Task Force 
recommended five changes in the MPO structure: (1) the use of a standard 
MPO throughout the military; (2) a requirement that the MPO be in writing; 
(3) a requirement that the victim receive a copy of the MPO within 24 hours; 
(4) establishment of a centralized system to record and track MPOs; and (5) a 
requirement that copies of the MPO be provided to base Military Police (MP) 
personnel and the FAP.75  The DoD also agreed to amend DoD Directive 
6400.1 to comport with each recommendation, with the exception of the fourth 
issue regarding a centralized tracking system, which is being studied further.76  
These changes make it much more likely that, in the event an MPO is issued, 
the appropriate parties will be informed so that the MPO can be effectively 
enforced.  A standard written MPO will also help to ensure equal treatment 
among domestic violence offenders against whom an MPO is issued.  Most 
importantly, issuing a copy of the MPO to the victim should alert the victim 
that her complaint has been taken seriously and that steps will be taken to 
properly enforce the order and protect her from her abuser should the offender 
violate the MPO.77 
Another important addition to DoD Directive 6400.1 is the Task Force’s 
recommendation that commanding officers receive domestic violence training 
within ninety days of being appointed, and then annually thereafter.78  The 
DoD has agreed to amend DoD Directive 6400.1 to require such training and 
to further provide training for senior non-commissioned officers according to a 
standardized program.79  The Task Force has also provided detailed 
information describing the topics that should be encompassed by the training.80  
Educating commanding officers about domestic violence is extremely 
important because the commander’s response often determines whether or not 
 
 74. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 149. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  Given the new law regarding enforcement of civil protective orders on military 
bases, the Task Force has also recommended that the DoD set standard enforcement policies for 
civilian criminal warrants and civil protective orders on military bases.  Id. at 157.  The DoD has 
agreed to achieve this objective through training.  Id. 
 78. Id. at 149. 
 79. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 149. 
 80. Id. 
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the victim receives the appropriate assistance and whether the offender will be 
held accountable.81 
The Task Force recommended the following changes to the way the 
military law enforcement structure responds to domestic violence, including: 
(1) the development of an initial domestic violence training program for the 
military police; (2) ensuring domestic violence training for local MP patrollers; 
(3) the creation of mobile training units; (4) development of a list of state-of-
the-art domestic violence equipment, and (5) initiation of evidence-based 
training for staff judge advocates.82  The DoD has agreed to amend DoD 
Directive 6400.1 to include the first two recommendations, but it agreed only 
to study further the final three recommendations.83  Because law enforcement 
intervention often places the victim in more danger as the abuser feels a loss of 
control, proper domestic violence training for personnel in the military 
criminal justice system is critical to ensuring victim safety.84 
The Task Force made further recommendations meant to reflect the 
criminal nature of many incidents of domestic violence.  Suggested 
amendments to the DoD Directive regarding the criminality of such violence 
included: (1) investigating each incident of domestic violence to determine 
whether a crime has been committed; (2) training members of law 
enforcement, command, and the legal department to collaborate when making 
a determination regarding whether a crime has been committed, and (3) 
developing guidelines for commanding officers in determining whether an 
incident of domestic violence is substantiated.85  The DoD agreed with the first 
recommendation with regard to first responders.86  DoD Directive 6400.1 will 
be amended to include the training recommendations included in the second 
recommendation, and the third recommendation will be implemented in a 
manner that is consistent with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the 
 
 81. Buel, supra note 47, at 24.  Other changes to be discussed infra make the commander’s 
role less critical.  Nevertheless, it is imperative that military base commanders are appropriately 
educated about the need to prevent domestic violence in military communities. 
 82. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 149.  The Task Force 
also recommends domestic violence training for the chaplainry; the DoD agreed to amend the 
DoD Directive accordingly and a signed memorandum regarding this policy was issued by the 
DoD on Nov. 19, 2001.  Id. at 150.  Likewise, the DoD concurred with Task Force 
recommendations regarding the domestic violence training of military healthcare workers and 
agreed to amend the DoD Directive to provide for such training.  Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See generally Virginia E. Hench, When Less is More—Can Reducing Penalties Reduce 
Household Violence?, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 37 (1997) (discussing the risk of increased violence 
because of police involvement and the need for police to be properly trained to respond to 
domestic violence incidents). 
 85. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 151. 
 86. Id. 
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Manual for Courts-Martial.87  The importance of conveying the message that 
domestic violence is criminal conduct that will not be allowed on military 
bases cannot be overemphasized.  Following the deaths at Fort Bragg, the 
message from the highest levels of military command should be that domestic 
abusers will be punished for their criminal acts.88  Having established 
guidelines for commanders will also help to ensure a uniform response to 
domestic violence in military communities. 
Victim advocates have identified the lack of confidentiality as one of the 
major problems in obtaining help within the military.89  The Task Force has 
also recognized the lack of confidentiality as an area of concern, 
recommending that the DoD: (1) work with the Task Force to expand the 
National Domestic Violence Hotline and pilot a program with the Department 
of Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice to make 
confidential community services available, and (2) explore other options for 
creating a means of providing services to victims confidentially.90  These 
recommendations were approved, and a template is now being created for the 
National Domestic Violence Hotline to be used for military-related calls.91  
Increased confidentiality should encourage more victims and more offenders to 
seek help. 
The reports issued by the Task Force also include several 
recommendations aimed at ensuring that residents of military bases are aware 
of the military’s position on domestic violence and the resources that are 
available to residents, such as: (1) inclusion of information about domestic 
violence in the information packet given to new residents; (2) issuance of a 
statement on victim safety from the Secretary of Defense; (3) issuance of 
specific information about services offered by FAP, and (4) issuance of 
specific information on local community-based domestic violence services and 
the National Domestic Violence Hotline.92  The DoD has signaled its 
agreement with these proposals and is committed to implementing them.93  
 
 87. Id.  The Task Force also recommended that the DoD establish a policy regarding which 
party should be removed from military housing following an incident of domestic violence and a 
policy to ensure that first responders are trained to identify a primary aggressor.  Id. at 152.  The 
DoD agreed to amend DoD Directive 6400.1 to include a removal policy but disagreed that first 
responders should be trained to identify a primary aggressor.  Id.  Because the Task Force 
believes such identification enhances the victim’s safety, the Task Force has requested that the 
DoD reconsider the matter.  Id. 
 88. Bateman, supra note 3. 
 89. Martz, supra note 6. 
 90. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 153. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  The DoD further agreed that in cases where a service member with an open domestic 
violence case is to be transferred to another base, the commander of the base gaining the service 
member should be notified that a case is pending and the FAP officer at the gaining base should 
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Educating residents of the military base is a critical part of the process of 
fighting domestic violence.  A woman in the midst of an abusive situation is in 
crisis.  In seeking help, she may not know about the full range of assistance 
options available to her, or she may not be aware that help is available at all.  
Making information about available resources part of the information families 
are given upon arrival will enable the woman to review her options and make 
decisions about how to deal with her situation before an emergency arises. 
The three Task Force reports include several recommendations designed to 
ensure the safety of the victim, something the previous DoD Directive had not 
emphasized.  Among these recommendations are the following: (1) 
development of safety plan policies for the armed services; (2) adoption of a 
safety plan prepared by the Task Force; (3) adoption of a tool for assessing risk 
prepared by the Task Force, and (4) ensuring that victim advocates are 
available to assist victims in risk assessment and safety planning.94  The DoD 
agreed with the first two recommendations and agreed to study the third and 
fourth recommendations for possible implementation.95  Completion of a risk 
assessment and the preparation of a safety plan are vital means of helping a 
victim decide on a course of action.  If she decides to attempt to leave the 
abusive relationship, a risk assessment can help ascertain the level of danger 
she is currently in and how that level may change if and when her partner 
becomes aware that she is planning to leave.  A safety plan can help the victim 
prepare to leave safely, but a safety plan is also necessary for the partner who 
chooses to remain in the relationship because safety plans typically include an 
emergency plan for quickly getting out of sudden violent situations.  The 
military must provide these resources if its domestic violence victim assistance 
provisions is to be successful. 
Finally, the Task Force made several proposals to educate the military 
community about domestic violence, including: (1) collaboration with agencies 
experienced with domestic violence prevention to develop a continuous 
awareness campaign; (2) emphasis on non-tolerance of domestic violence by 
senior leadership; (3) inclusion of domestic violence education in schools for 
officers and enlistees; (4) inclusion of domestic violence education as a part of 
local training; (5) targeting of domestic violence education to grades E1–E4; 
(6) highlighting the need to reach spouses who reside off the base; (7) 
incorporation of domestic violence education in dependent schools; and (8) 
provision of diversity education for members overseas.96  The DoD agreed 
 
inform the commander of available services.  Id. at 156.  The DoD is also of the opinion that 
transfer should be delayed if the domestic violence case had opened within 60 days of the 
transfer.  Id. 
 94. Id. at 162. 
 95. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 162. 
 96. Id. at 159. 
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with these recommendations, although it indicated that proposal (7) required 
more study.97  This plan of raising awareness about domestic violence is much 
more comprehensive than anything the military has tried previously.  
Heightened awareness of the problem should result in some prevention and in 
more people within the military community coming forward to receive needed 
assistance. 
IV.  THE IMPACT OF THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
IN THE MILITARY 
While the VAWA initially had little or no impact on the response to 
domestic violence in the military, another piece of legislation meant to address 
domestic violence in the civilian sector did have an impact (albeit uncertain) 
on the way the military handled domestic violence before the current sweeping 
changes.  Around the same time the VAWA was enacted, Congress expanded 
the Gun Control Act of 1968 through legislation known as the Lautenberg 
Amendment98 “to include domestic violence-related crimes.”99  The Act now 
prohibits a person who is subject to a protective order from possessing 
firearms, so long as the order was issued after the respondent had reasonable 
notice and the opportunity to be heard, and the issuing court specifically found 
that the respondent threatens the petitioner’s physical safety.100  The Gun 
Control Act also makes it unlawful to knowingly transfer a firearm to a person 
who is subject to a valid protective order.101 
It is now illegal for a person to possess a firearm after being convicted of a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.102  The prohibition is operative even 
for domestic violence convictions that occurred before the Lautenberg 
Amendment’s effective date of September 30, 1996;103 however, the 
prohibition only applies if an element of the misdemeanor was the threatened 
use of a deadly weapon or the use or attempted use of physical force.104  The 
prohibition will not be triggered unless the statute under which the defendant 
was convicted uses the appropriate language—the use of violence by itself is 
not enough.105  “A conviction for a misdemeanor violation of a protection 
order will not qualify, therefore, even if the act was violent, unless the statute 
requires the use or attempted use of physical force or the threatened use of a 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009–371 (1996) (codified as amended in 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2261–2266 (2000)). 
 99. Peters, supra note 23, at 15. 
 100. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2000). 
 101. Id. at § 922(d)(8). 
 102. Id. at § 922(g)(9). 
 103. Peters, supra note 23, at 17. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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deadly weapon.”106  It is also illegal to make a knowing transfer of a firearm to 
someone who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence.107  Persons who buy firearms are now required to make a statement 
that they have not been convicted of any misdemeanor domestic violence 
crimes.108  This legislation affects the military because § 922(d)(9) (transfers of 
firearms to persons with misdemeanor domestic violence convictions) and § 
922(g)(9) (possession of firearms by persons who have been convicted of a 
domestic violence misdemeanor) are not subject to the official use 
exemption.109  “This means that law enforcement officers or military personnel 
who have been convicted of a qualifying domestic violence misdemeanor 
cannot lawfully possess or receive firearms for any purpose, including the 
performance of official duties.”110  The inability to use or possess a firearm for 
any purpose is therefore, at least theoretically, career-ending for any service 
member who is convicted of a misdemeanor domestic violence crime.111 
Lack of clear enforcement guidelines has left the application of the 
Lautenberg Amendment to service members inconsistent and unsettled.112  The 
DoD has not issued guidance beyond those policies that were announced when 
the Lautenberg Amendment was first passed.113  Under the current 
implementation scheme, unit commanders are responsible for determining 
which service members are affected by the Lautenberg Amendment and 
reassigning those service members to positions that do not require the use of 
firearms.114  Because of the military’s lack of a centralized database of persons 
who have been convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors, making these 
determinations is a very time-consuming task for the commander.115  When 
there is cause for a commander to believe that a service member has been 
convicted of a misdemeanor of domestic violence, the commander must pass 
all available information on to the military’s local legal department.116  The 
local legal department is subject to the laws of the state in which it is 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(9) (2000). 
 108. See Peters, supra note 23, at 17. 
 109. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (2000). 
 110. Peters, supra note 23, at 18. 
 111. See, e.g., Jacey Eckhart, When War Between Spouses Hits Home, VIRGINIAN–PILOT & 
LEDGER–STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Aug. 10, 2002, at E1 (arguing that “[i]t is more likely that the 
consequences for reporting domestic abuse are higher for the military than for civilians” because 
“[a] conviction for domestic abuse means the end of the career”). 
 112. Jessica A. Golden, Examining the Lautenberg Amendment in the Civilian and Military 
Contexts: Congressional Overreaching, Statutory Vagueness, Ex Post Facto Violations, and 
Implementational Flaws, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 427, 461-62 (2001). 
 113. Id. at 462. 
 114. Id. at 460. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] SAFE AT HOME BASE? 293 
located.117  The legal department then must make a case-by-case determination 
of “whether the soldier had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence under state law, and whether the soldier had knowingly and 
intelligently waived a jury trial.”118 As a result of the difficulties in identifying 
service members who are technically subject to the Lautenberg Amendment, 
the number of service members who have been discharged as a result of 
misdemeanor domestic violence convictions is very low, and “military 
personnel are being allowed to retain their weapons until they are discharged 
or separated from military service.”119  The military may also be avoiding 
losses in recruitment caused by the Lautenberg Amendment by issuing moral 
waivers120 to individuals who have been convicted of domestic violence crimes 
and other misdemeanors and felonies, essentially doing an end-run around the 
policy underlying the Lautenberg Amendment.121  “More guidance must be 
given before the Lautenberg Amendment can be effectively applied, or achieve 
its intended purpose of reducing domestic violence in the military.”122 
Opponents of the Lautenberg Amendment have also argued that the 
Amendment is flawed because it allows service members convicted of 
domestic violence felonies to keep their firearms (and presumably remain in 
the military) while preventing service members who have misdemeanor 
domestic violence convictions from carrying weapons in performance of their 
military duties.123  However, there is an alternative interpretation to the 
congressional purpose behind the Lautenberg Amendment: 
The majority of domestic violence charges and prosecutions are 
misdemeanors, but the police and military only screen those with felony 
convictions.  Given this situation, it is reasonable that Congress recognized the 
danger of armed police and military personnel with domestic violence 
misdemeanor convictions.  Congress merely filled a gap by blocking those 
with domestic violence misdemeanor convictions in these areas of employment 
from access to guns as was already policy for domestic violence felonies.124 
 
 117. Golden, supra note 112, at 460. 
 118. Id. at 460-61. 
 119. Id. at 462. 
 120. Moral waivers would allow service members to be admitted to or remain in positions 
that allow them to possess a firearm despite a qualifying conviction under the Lautenberg 
Amendment.  The DoD has indicated its willingness to ensure that such waivers are granted only 
in appropriate circumstances.  DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 
151. 
 121. Golden, supra note 112, at 462. 
 122. Id. at 463. 
 123. Captain E. John Gregory, The Lautenberg Amendment: Gun Control in the U.S. Army, 
ARMY LAW., Oct. 2000, at 3, 13-14. 
 124. Alison J. Nathan, Note, At the Intersection of Domestic Violence and Guns: The Public 
Interest Exception and the Lautenberg Amendment, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 852 (2000). 
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Another challenge to the Lautenberg Amendment is that the alleged 
disparate treatment of a service member convicted of a domestic violence 
felony and a service member convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor 
runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.125  
Opponents recognize, however, that courts have almost uniformly applied 
rational basis review, the lowest level of scrutiny, to cases arising under the 
Lautenberg Amendment.126  Under this low level of scrutiny, “a law will be 
sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if 
the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if 
the rationale for it seems tenuous.”127  The Lautenberg Amendment satisfies 
this standard because: 
The rational basis for the Amendment lies in Congress’s attempt to mend the 
loophole that has allowed so many violent felons to plea-bargain down to 
misdemeanors.  Prior to the Lautenberg Amendment, felons who successfully 
plead down to misdemeanors evaded the Gun Control Act’s ban on gun 
possession by convicted felons.  The Lautenberg Amendment strives to 
prevent this evasion and to further the government’s goal of reducing gun-
related domestic violence nationwide.128 
The Lautenberg Amendment also satisfies rational basis review because there 
is no indication of intentional discrimination.129 
It has been argued that the Lautenberg Amendment has a negative impact 
on military readiness because of the burden that implementation of the 
Amendment places on individual base commanders.130  The same argument 
could presumably be made about the “burden” of enforcing protective orders 
issued by state courts on military bases.131  This complaint is not surprising, 
given the deference that is typically shown to the military and military base 
commanders by both Congress and the courts. 
Whatever the perceived drawbacks of the Lautenberg Amendment, the 
military is now committed to finding a way to implement its provisions 
successfully.  The Task Force has recommended that the DoD: (1) conduct an 
awareness campaign about the Lautenberg Amendment, and (2) require further 
education about the Lautenberg Amendment on an annual basis.132  The DoD 
has signaled its agreement with these recommendations and its intention to 
 
 125. Gregory, supra note 123, at 14.  See also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 
U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all 
persons similarly situated should be treated alike”). 
 126. Golden, supra note 112, at 452. 
 127. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
 128. Golden, supra note 112, at 453-54. 
 129. Nathan, supra note 124, at 852. 
 130. See Gregory, supra note 123, at 16. 
 131. See discussion infra Part VI. 
 132. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at 150. 
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amend DoD Directive 6400.1 accordingly.133  In addition to the obvious 
benefits of keeping firearms out of the hands of domestic violence offenders, 
clarification of the impact of the Lautenberg Amendment and a commitment to 
follow its requirements is an important step in the military’s plan to hold 
offenders accountable for their actions and to ensure that military offenders are 
treated equally within the military’s criminal justice system.134 
V.  NEW CIVIL ORDER OF PROTECTION OPTIONS FOR MILITARY VICTIMS OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
A civil order of protection is an important tool for victims attempting to 
leave an abusive relationship and avoid further violence.  The VAWA 
recognized this by making it a federal crime to cross state lines with the intent 
to violate a valid protective order,135 and by ensuring that an order of 
protection that was issued by a court with jurisdiction over the parties and that 
comported with due process requirements, could be enforced in other 
jurisdictions.136  Because MPOs were often issued without the respondent 
having the benefit of a hearing, such orders did not qualify for full faith and 
credit.  Also, because military bases are areas subject to some level of federal 
jurisdiction, courts had been unsure regarding jurisdiction to issue protective 
orders to residents of such bases.  Uncertainty about the extent of this federal 
jurisdiction deterred state courts and law enforcement from getting involved in 
domestic violence situations on military bases.  State court judges, wary of 
overstepping jurisdictional boundaries, were reluctant to issue a protective 
order to a resident of a military base.  The reluctance of the state to get 
involved with domestic violence on military bases also extended to the civilian 
police because of uncertainty about “authority, obligations, and liability.”137  
Because this confusion about jurisdiction contributed to the belief that the 
VAWA protections did not extend to residents of military bases and to the fact 
that courts and local law enforcement agencies were seemingly reluctant to 
give protection to victims of domestic violence in military communities, it is 
useful to look at how federal enclave jurisdiction came about and how it has 
been viewed by the courts. 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. The DoD, pursuant to a Task Force recommendation, has agreed to issue final guidance 
on the Lautenberg Amendment, including discharges under the Amendment.  Id. at 151. 
 135. 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1) (2000). 
 136. Id. at § 2265(a).  Because due process includes notice and the opportunity to be heard, 
many MPOs issued under the 1992 version of the DoD Directive did not meet full faith and credit 
requirements.  See infra notes 29–34 and accompanying text. 
 137. Major Stephen E. Castlen & Lieutenant Colonel Gregory O. Block, Exclusive Federal 
Legislative Jurisdiction: Get Rid of It!, 154 MIL. L. REV. 113, 114 (1997). 
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The power to establish federal enclaves within the states was granted to 
Congress by the Constitution.138  Federal enclave jurisdiction was conceived of 
by the Continental Congress in response to a soldier’s rebellion sparked by 
non-payment of Revolutionary War wages in 1783.139  For four days, the 
soldiers gathered outside the hall where Congress met and noisily, but without 
violence, demanded their wages be paid.140  The Continental Congress 
requested that Pennsylvania call up its militia to put an end to the gatherings, 
but Pennsylvania refused to act in the absence of injury or property damage.141  
The memory of what had occurred rankled with members of Congress and led 
to the inclusion of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 in the Constitution.142  The 
point of creating federal enclaves was “to protect federal activities by limiting 
or completely excluding state authority on federal lands . . . .”143  Federal 
legislative jurisdiction is essentially a property interest; that is, the jurisdiction 
is based on the federal government’s acquisition of an interest in land.144  The 
jurisdiction, and the legislative authority that accompanies it, is dependent on 
the terms of the grant of land from the state to the federal government.145  The 
three types of federal legislative jurisdiction are “exclusive, concurrent, and 
partial.”146 
Areas of exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction are known as enclaves.147  
In enclaves, all legislative authority rests with the federal government.148  The 
only power that the state retains on a federal enclave is “the right to serve 
process resulting from activities or incidents which occurred off the land.”149  
States usually do not have any power to enforce criminal laws on federal 
enclaves.150  States are also limited in their authority to collect personal and 
property taxes and to enforce civil laws.151  “Determining what law applies on 
 
 138. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17.  The clause grants Congress the power “[t]o exercise 
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) 
as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the 
Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the 
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, 
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.”  Id. 
 139. Castlen & Block, supra note 137, at 114. 
 140. Id. at 119. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 120. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Castlen & Block, supra note 137, at 115. 
 145. Id. at 116. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Castlen & Block, supra note 137, at 116. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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enclaves is often confusing because it depends, in part, on how and when the 
federal government received jurisdiction.”152  This confusion contributed to the 
unwillingness of state court judges to provide the relief that is normally 
available to domestic abuse victims under state law. 
The other two types of federal legislative jurisdiction, concurrent and 
partial, are characterized by some degree of nonexclusive federal control.  The 
second kind of federal legislative jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction, occurs 
“where the state [has] reserved or obtained the right to exercise all legislative 
authority concurrent with the federal government.”153  The civil and criminal 
law of both the state and the federal government are applicable and both have 
the right to exercise authority.154  The third kind of federal legislative 
jurisdiction is partial legislative jurisdiction.  “Partial legislative jurisdiction 
applies to parcels of land where the state granted the federal government some 
legislative authority, but the state reserved to itself the right to exercise other 
authority in addition to the right to serve civil or criminal process.”155 
The view of the courts until the 1950s was that federal enclave jurisdiction 
excluded all state governmental power.156  For example, a Maryland court 
found that residents of federal enclaves were not considered to be citizens of 
the state in which the enclave was located.157  Because of this exclusion from 
citizenship, “enclave residents were not entitled to [file for divorce,] receive 
state education, vote, hold office, or receive any benefits derived from state 
residency.”158 
The 1953 Supreme Court case of Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking 
Fund of Louisville began to temper this extreme view of federal enclave 
jurisdiction.159  The Howard court permitted Louisville, Kentucky to levy an 
earnings tax on the people who lived on a naval base.160  The Court stressed 
the need for the competing jurisdictions to coexist comfortably: 
The fiction of a state within a state can have no validity to prevent the state 
from exercising its power over the federal area within its boundaries, so long 
as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal 
Government.  The sovereign rights in this dual relationship are not 
antagonistic.  Accommodation and cooperation are their aim.  It is friction, not 
fiction, to which we must give heed.161 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 117. 
 154. Castlen & Block, supra note 137, at 117. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 122. 
 157. Id. (citing Lowe v. Lowe, 133 A. 729 (Md. 1926)). 
 158. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 159. Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624 (1953). 
 160. Id. at 628. 
 161. Id. at 627. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
298 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:277 
Since Howard, the judiciary has widened considerably the range of rights 
available to enclave residents.  Enclave residents have been allowed to vote in 
the state in which the enclave is located since 1970.162  Federal courts have 
also allowed residents of federal enclaves to hold local political offices and 
receive local public assistance.163 
Of particular interest in the domestic violence context is Cobb v. Cobb, a 
case decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.164  The Cobb court 
held that the fact that a female service member lived and worked on a military 
base did not preclude her from obtaining a protective order against her abusive 
husband under Massachusetts law.165  The court further held that the order 
would be in force and enforceable on the military base.166  The issues were 
moot by the time they reached the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
because the order had been issued and had expired by its own terms, and there 
was no evidence or allegation that the husband had violated the order while it 
was in effect.167  The judge who issued the protective order, apparently 
concerned about his authority to do so, certified two questions to the Supreme 
Judicial Court on the day the order was issued.168  The court decided to answer 
the questions despite the fact that the case was moot because “the issue was of 
 
 162. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 426 (1970). 
 163. Castlen & Block, supra note 137, at 123. 
 164. Cobb v. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (Mass. 1989).  The U.S. Army and the Department of 
Justice, among others, submitted amici curiae briefs on behalf of plaintiff Diane Cobb.  Id.  The 
Army and the Justice Department were willing to invoke the power and protection of the state to 
prevent abuse of a service member by her civilian husband.  Id. at 1163.  It seems logical to 
assume that these protections should cut both ways and offer the protections of restraining orders 
to civilian wives of military husbands.  Yet there is no case law on the issue, and the Army’s 
desire to handle cases of domestic violence perpetrated by soldiers internally was much discussed 
in the wake of the killings at Fort Bragg.  Even in its support of Diane Cobb, however, the 
Army’s brief was careful to note that in its opinion, the Howard line of cases does not make it 
clear that the Supreme Court meant to overrule all aspects of previous enclave precedent.  Id. at 
1163 n.4.  The Army’s position is that “absent a contrary Federal law, a State law adopted after 
the cession of the land would apply in an enclave if that subsequent regulatory scheme was 
consistent with the ‘basic state law’ in effect at the time the land was ceded.”  Id.  The law 
invoked by the plaintiff happened to be similar to laws in effect at the time the land was ceded to 
Fort Devens.  Id. 
 165. Id. at 1164. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 1162. 
 168. Id.  The questions were as follows: 
1. Is this Court precluded from issuing a restraining order under the provisions of G.L. c. 
209A barring the defendant James Cobb from approaching, contacting, or abusing the 
plaintiff Diane Cobb solely because the plaintiff Diane Cobb is a member of the United 
States Armed Forces who resides and works at Fort Devens?  2. If this Court is not 
precluded from issuing such an order, is the order legally effective within the confines of 
Fort Devens, where the plaintiff resides and works? 
Id. at 1162 n.1. 
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public importance, was likely to arise again, and was not likely to be capable 
of appellate review before the recurring question would again be moot.”169  
The issuing judge had indicated in his certification that the question of whether 
persons living on Fort Devens could obtain relief under the state’s protection 
order laws was one that arose frequently.170  The judge had also indicated that 
his issuance of the order was in accord with recent changes in United States 
Supreme Court policy “moving away from the view that this court expressed 
years ago that, barring a statute to the contrary, State law does not apply in 
lands ceded to the Federal Government.”171 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court construed the issue as: 
[W]hether this court should now abandon (indeed must abandon) its earlier 
view [that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction in areas that were 
ceded to it, so as to bar the operation of state law] in favor of the United States 
Supreme Court’s more recent controlling interpretation of the Constitution of 
the United States.172 
The court then reviewed the Howard line of cases173 and concluded that the 
Supreme Court of the United States has “shown that the Constitution of the 
United States does not bar extension of the benefits and burdens of all State 
laws to inhabitants of land ceded to the Federal Government.”174  The court 
found that there was no evidence that enforcing the order on the military base 
would interfere with any federal function.175  The court also noted that, 
according to the briefs submitted, there was no alternative to the Massachusetts 
law available on the military base, and the military had even encouraged the 
use of state law in such cases.176 
The Cobb court indicated that its holding was compelled by the line of 
Supreme Court cases that had extended the benefit of state laws to residents of 
federal enclaves located within the state.177  Under the Cobb approach, a 
federal enclave resident would be treated as a resident of the state for purposes 
of obtaining and enforcing a protective order as long as the state had laws 
governing the issuance of protective orders at the time the land was ceded to 
the federal government.178  This approach would negate the problem of 
 
 169. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d at 1162. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See discussion supra notes 139–53 and accompanying text. 
 174. Cobb, 545 N.E.2d at 1163. 
 175. Id. at 1164. 
 176. Id. at 1164 n.5. 
 177. Id. at 1163. 
 178. This approach could cause obvious problems, given the uncertainty often surrounding 
how and when a particular tract of land became part of a federal enclave.  See Castlen & Block, 
supra note 137, at 125. 
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competing jurisdictions by making a valid order enforceable both on and off 
the military base.  The lack of case law about the issuance and enforcement of 
protective orders on military bases from other states could indicate that other 
state courts chose not to follow the precedent from Massachusetts.179 
The Cobb approach negated the problem of state versus federal 
jurisdiction, but the decision was not widely followed.  Advocates who 
approved of the way Cobb was decided encouraged Congress to enact 
legislation that would afford state law protections to residents of military 
bases.180  After the decision in Cobb, access to state law protections became 
even more important.  Passage of the VAWA meant that a woman who had 
received a qualifying protective order from a state court could invoke the 
protection of federal anti-domestic violence laws.  Residents in military 
communities, however, were still denied these protections. 
More than a decade after Cobb and nearly ten years after the passage of the 
VAWA, Congress finally responded to the needs of domestic violence victims 
on military bases.  The Armed Forces Domestic Security Act181 provides that 
an order of protection issued by a civilian court has the same legal force and 
effect on a military installation as it has in the jurisdiction of the issuing 
court.182  The statute applies to both service members and civilians who are 
present on the base.183 
 
 179. See id. at 130-31 (discussing Cobb and opining that “issues of enforcement of state court 
orders against soldiers may rarely arise because those courts, afraid of stepping beyond their 
jurisdiction, might hesitate to issue such orders.”) 
 180. Michael J. Malinowski, Note, Federal Enclaves and Local Law: Carving Out a 
Domestic Violence Exception to Exclusive Federal Enclave Jurisdiction, 100 YALE L.J. 189 
(1990).  Other writers had suggested the retrocession of unnecessary jurisdiction over domestic 
relations to the state as a possible solution.  See Castlen & Block, supra note 137 passim. 
 181. Armed Forces Domestic Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-311, § 2, 116 Stat. 2455 
(2002) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.A. § 1561a (West Supp. 2003)).  The text of the statute 
reads as follows: 
(a) Force and effect.—A civilian order of protection shall have the same force and 
effect on a military installation as such order has within the jurisdiction of the 
court that issued such order. 
(b) Civilian order of protection defined.—In this section, the term ‘civilian order of 
protection’ has the meaning given the term ‘protection order’ in section 2266(5) of 
title 18. 
(c) Regulations.—The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to carry out 
this section. The regulations shall be designed to further good order and discipline 
by members of the armed forces and civilians present on military installations. 
Id. 
 182. Id.  The definition of protective order referred to in the statute is a reference to the 
definition of a protective order contained in VAWA: 
The term “protective order” includes any injunction or other order issued for the purpose 
of preventing violent or threatening acts or harassment against, or contact or 
communication with or physical proximity to, another person, including any temporary or 
final order issued by a civil and criminal court (other than a support or child custody order 
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This legislation is immensely important to victims of domestic violence in 
military communities.  A woman who lives or works on a military base and 
obtains an order of protection from a state court now derives the same benefit 
any other woman would derive from the order even though she is technically 
crossing a jurisdictional line by living or working on a military base.  The 
VAWA “makes an essential step toward providing more extensive protection 
for victims of domestic violence.”184  Federal legislation now “recognizes that 
domestic violence is a national problem that crosses state lines.”185  This 
recognition is no less true when the line that is crossed is the line between a 
state and a federal enclave.  The risk of serious violence often increases if the 
abused partner threatens or attempts to leave the relationship, making it 
necessary for the fleeing partner to be assured of legal protection wherever she 
goes.186  This new legislation signals an attempt by Congress to ensure that one 
of the original goals of the VAWA—that all women who are subjected to 
violence by their partners should have the benefit of a validly-issued protective 
order—is met. 
Formerly, a victim of domestic violence fleeing a federal enclave faced a 
dangerous situation.  Issuance of a protective order subject to full faith and 
credit requires notice to satisfy the due process rights of the respondent.187  
“For the woman who has fled her attacker, this notification could prove 
deadly.”188  The victim of domestic violence who flees a federal enclave 
previously faced a difficult choice between giving up the protections of an 
order altogether or revealing her whereabouts to her abuser.  Putting the victim 
in this position is manifestly unfair.  It is precisely this sort of untenable choice 
that the Full Faith and Credit provision of the VAWA sought to alleviate.189  
 
issued pursuant to State divorce and child custody laws, except to the extent that such an 
order is entitled to full faith and credit under other Federal law) whether obtained by filing 
an independent order or as a pendente lite order in another proceeding so long as any civil 
order was issued in response to a complaint, petition, or motion filed by or on behalf of a 
person seeking protection. 
18 U.S.C. § 2266(5) (2000). 
 183. Armed Forces Domestic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-311, § 2(a), 116 Stat. 2455 
(2002) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.A. § 1561a (West Supp. 2003)). 
 184. Klein, supra note 33, at 269-70. 
 185. Id. at 270. 
 186. Klein & Orloff, supra note 7, at 816.  Studies conducted in Chicago and Philadelphia 
found that 25% of women who were killed by male partners were either separated or divorced 
from their abusers, and a further 29% were killed during the process of being divorced or 
separated.  Id. 
 187. Klein, supra note 33, at 355. 
 188. Melissa L. Tatum, A Jurisdictional Quandary: Challenges Facing Tribal Governments 
in Implementing the Full Faith and Credit Provisions of the Violence Against Women Acts, 90 
KY. L.J. 123, 131 (2002). 
 189. Id. at 130-31. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
302 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:277 
Likewise, under the Armed Forces Domestic Security Act, a woman who 
chooses to leave her abusive partner may now file for an order of protection in 
a court of the state where the military installation is located.190  This order 
would be issued in conformance with the state’s due process requirements and 
would allow the respondent notice and the opportunity to be heard.  The order 
would then be enforceable on the military base while the victim made 
preparations to leave, and this same order would be enforceable without a 
further notice requirement in the jurisdiction to which the victim moved under 
the VAWA’s full faith and credit provisions.191  The new law, in conjunction 
with the VAWA, ensures that the woman who has successfully removed 
herself from an abusive situation does not have to place herself in jeopardy by 
revealing her location to the very person with whom she is seeking to avoid 
contact.  The new law also allows a woman who wishes to avail herself of the 
domestic violence protections afforded by state law to do so without fear that 
the protective order she obtains will be unenforceable in her home.  In other 
words, the new law affords a victim of abuse the opportunity to avoid the 
military chain of command entirely by allowing her to go directly to the 
civilian courts, thus negating the possibility of having to deal with an 
unresponsive commander. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence should be commended for 
its dedication and hard work.  Because the Department of Defense has agreed 
with the majority of the Task Force’s nearly 200 recommendations,192 there is 
good reason to believe that much needed changes will occur in the way the 
military handles domestic violence.  Accepting these recommendations, 
however, is just the beginning.  In its final report, the Task Force expressed 
concern about the fatalities at Fort Bragg and about continuing weaknesses and 
room for improvement in provisions for domestic violence services at military 
bases across the country.193  The Department of Defense has not yet reached 
final decisions on several of the Task Force’s recommendations; particularly 
those related to ensuring victim safety and the creation of new advocacy 
positions on military installations.  A combination of new laws such as the 
Armed Forces Domestic Security Act and a complete reevaluation and 
reconception of the role of the military in addressing domestic violence in 
military communities is needed in order to ensure that all victims of domestic 
 
 190. See Pub. L. No. 107-311, § 2(a), 116 Stat. 2455 (2002) (codified as amended at 10 
U.S.C.A. § 1561a (West Supp. 2003)). 
 191. See id. 
 192. DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 42, at vii. 
 193. Id. at v. 
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violence in the military have access to effective assistance in ending the 
violence in their lives. 
JENNIFER HEINTZ* 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Saint Louis University School of Law.  My thanks to Ms. Connie 
Sponsler of the Battered Women’s Justice Center and to Brigadier General Joseph Composto and 
Major Eric Rishel of the United States Marine Corps for getting me started.  My thanks also to 
my husband John George for his patience.  Assistant Professor Camille Nelson also deserves 
thanks for her comments and feedback on early drafts of this Comment. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
304 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:277 
 
